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PROPERTY LAW
BERTA E. HERNANDEZ*

This section of the Survey of New Mexico law reviews decisions of
the state courts in the area of property law. The article discusses case
law holdings in four parts: Private and Public Land Use Controls; Actions
and Proceedings; Deeds and Titles; and Contracts. The cases this year
present significant developments in the law, particularly in the private
nuisance area and in the New Mexico view of real estate contracts.
I. PRIVATE AND PUBLIC LAND USE CONTROLS

Four cases decided this year concerned private and public controls on
the use of land. Three cases focused on private controls-one easement
case] and two restrictive covenant cases. 2 The case on public land use
control addressed issues on zoning. 3
A. PrivateLand Use Controls

1. Easements
In Brooks v. Tanner,4 the New Mexico Supreme Court invalidated a
transfer of an easement appurtenant.5 Tanner owned "[six] lots in the
Monticello Subdivision of Tijeras Canyon, east of Albuquerque." 6 In
1953, Tanner conveyed two lots, together with a 12-foot easement to one
*Professor Hernandez is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of New Mexico, School
of Law. The author would like to give special thanks to Neil Candelaria and Shari Weinstein for
their research assistance in connection with the Article.
1. Brooks v. Tanner, 101 N.M. 203, 680 P.2d 343 (1984).
2. Lockwood v. Steiner, 101 N.M. 783, 689 P.2d 932 (1984); Whorton v. Mr. C's, 101 N.M.
651, 687 P.2d 86 (1984).
3. City of Las Cruces v. Huerta, 102 N.M. 182, 692 P.2d 1331 (Ct. App. 1984).
4. 101 N.M. 203, 680 P.2d343 (1984). The Brooks are the plaintiffs-buyers of the property in
question.
5. The court provided a definition of an appurtenant easement as follows:
If it appears from such a construction of the grant on reservation that the parties
intended to create a right in the nature of an easement in the property retained for
the benefit of the property granted, or to reserve such a right in the property granted
for the benefit of the property retained, as the case may be, such right will be deemed
an easement appurtenant, and not in gross, regardless of the form in which such
intention is expressed.
Brooks, 101 N.M. at 205, 680 P.2d at 345 (quoting 28 C.J.S. Easements §4 (1941)).
6. Brooks, 101 N.M. at 204, 680 P.2d at 344.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

Calverley.7 The easement allowed Calverley access to a main road of the
subdivision.
9
In 1969, Tanner sold Brooks two lots and portions of two other lots.
Tanner retained a 12-foot easement in the land sold in order to have access
from his property to a main road.' 0 In 1972, Tanner sought to convey a
right to use the easement across the Brooks' property in order to provide
access to the main road to the Oliver property" located to the east of
Tanner's lots. 12
In 1972, the Herreras succeeded in ownership to the Oliver property.' 3
In 1980 they graded a road, as successors in interest to the 1972 easement,
to have access to their property from the main road.' 4 This new road ran
across the portion of the Brooks' land on which Tanner had reserved an
easement. '"Because of the improved condition of the road, traffic on the
Brooks' property substantially increased. 6
7. Id. The lots Calverley purchased were numbered 138 and 139. The 12 foot easement granted
was over lot 14 and a portion of lot 140. The following sketch, which appears in the supreme court
opinion, is helpful for the analysis of the facts in this case. Id.

I

-- *fl1
CL

I

C

8. Id. The main road is Monticello Drive. Id.
9. Id. Brooks purchased lots numbered 14 and 15 and the westerly 40 feet of lots 140 and 141.
Tanner retained the easterly portion of lots 140 and 141. Id.
10. Id. at 204-05, 680 P.2d at 344-45. The main road to which the easement provided access is
Monticello Drive. id.
11. Id. at 205, 680 P.2d at 345. This easement was purportedly created by an instrument entitled
"Deed of Right of Way and Easement." Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. Prior to building the new road they accessed their property via an "old road" that intersected
with the public highway. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. The increased traffic was due, in part, to the fact that the Herrera tract now contained a
number of mobile homes. Id.
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The Brooks sought a preliminary injunction to stop the Herreras' use
of their property. '7 The Brooks asserted that the grant of the easement
from Tanner to the Herreras' predecessor-in-title, Oliver, had no legal
effect.'
The district court held that Tanner's reservation of an easement for use
as a road over the Brooks' property had been conveyed properly.' 9 Thus,
the Herreras, as successors-in-interest, could use the road.2 ° The Brooks
appealed the district court decision.
* The supreme court focused on the type of easement Tanner expressly
reserved in his conveyance to the Brooks. The court analyzed whether
the easement granted was appurtenant 2 ' or in gross,22 and concentrated
its analysis on the provisions of the contract between the parties.2 3
The supreme court found that the seller had reserved an appurtenant
easement, 4 the use of which he had no power to expand or convey in
connection with the Oliver tract now owned by the Herreras.25 The court
based its finding on the definitions of the types of easements in the context
of the contract. The contract created a benefit of ingress and egress to
the main road from Tanner's property. 6 The easement was appurtenant,
with Tanner's retained property as the dominant estate and the Brooks'
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. In addition, the court concluded that Herrera had an easement by prescription as well as
by necessity. Id.
21. Id. See supra note 5 for the court's definition of an appurtenant easement.
22. The definition of an easement in gross used by the court is "[i]f it appears... that the parties
intended to create a right to be attached to the person to whom it was granted or by whom it was
reserved, it will be deemed to be an easement in gross." Id. (quoting 28 C.J.S. Easements § 4
(1941)).
23. The court studied the following contractual provision in the real estate contract entered into
between Tanner and Brooks:
SUBJECT TO restrictions, reservations and easements of record and easements
as shown upon the plat of the above described property prepared by Ronald E.
Tyree, Registered Professional Land Surveyor No. 3516, in accordance with
survey made March 29, 1969, a copy of which plat is hereto attached, marked
Exhibit 'A' and made a part hereof; and to taxes for the year 1969 and subsequent
years, and SUBJECT also to a road easement granted to Hazel Calverley along
and over the Southerly twelve (12') feet of the above described property, recorded
in Book D-598, page 80, Records of Bemalillo County, New Mexico; and Owner
hereby reserves an easement for road purposes over the Southerly twelve (12')
feet of the above described property for use in connection with that portion of
Lots 140 and 141 of Monticello and not included in this sale and for ingress and
egress from his property to Monticello Drive, which easement shall be left open,.
Id. at 206, 680 P.2d at 346.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 207, 680 P.2d at 347. The court also held that there was no evidence to support the
creation of an easement by prescription or by necessity. Id. at 207-08, 680 P.2d at 347-48.
26. Id. at 206-07, 680 P.2d at 346-47.
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property as the servient estate.27 Here, no personal right was created in
favor of any individual because the easement was created for a limited
purpose and Tanner's interest in the easement could not be conveyed
freely. The instrument did not create a right to use plaintiffs' property for
access from the Herrera tract to the main road, 28 and the defendant could
not convey a right he did not have.
Thus, in Brooks, the court protected a servient estate from increased
use by invalidating a conveyance that was not limited to the scope originally envisioned by the servient tenants. In addition, the court protected.
the scope of the easement retained by strictly construing the language
granting the right of use.
2. Restrictive Covenants
The first of the two covenants cases this article addresses is Whorton
v. Mr. C's & Western Palace Restaurant.2 9 Whorton concerned the enforceability of a covenant that prohibited the sale of alcoholic beverages
in public places. 3"
Whorton sought an injunction from the district court to keep defendants
from selling wine and beer in their restaurants, located in the original
townsite of Alamogordo. 3 All the parties to the litigation held land titles
that contained covenants which prohibited the sale of alcoholic beverages
in public places. 32
The district court refused to issue an injunction because it found that
the character of the property had changed materially since the covenants
were first put into force. Such changes would render enforcement of the
covenants inequitable."
On appeal, Whorton challenged the ruling on the grounds that the
findings were not supported by sfbstantial evidence." The supreme court
considered whether the trial court had correctly used the doctrine of
changed circumstances35 to find that it would be inequitable and oppressive
27. The court in its opinion referred to rules of construction and noted the preference for appurtenant easements over easements in gross. Id. at 206, 680 P.2d at 346 (citing 3 R. POWELL, THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §405, at 34-20 (1981) [sic]; 28 C.J.S. Easements §4 (1941)).
28. See supra note 23.
29. 101 N.M. 651, 687 P.2d 86 (1984).
30. Id. at 652, 687 P.2d at 87.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 652-53, 687 P.2d at 87-88. The court used the "changed circumstances" doctrine. See
5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 679[2] (1985). See also infra note 35.
34. Whorton, 101 N.M. at 653, 687 P.2d at 88.
35. The court stated that for the "changed circumstances" standard to be satisfied, the changes
must render it impossible to obtain the benefits that were intended by the creation of the covenant.
It cited the RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 564 (1944). It is expected that some changes that occur
are normal; and changes that merely reduce the benefits to be derived from enforcement of the
covenant do not suffice for a court to refuse to enjoin a violation. Even a substantial change that
does not destroy the benefit is not sufficient for a court to refuse to grant equitable relief. Id.
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to enforce the covenants because the changes that occurred were of such
importance that they defeated the purpose of the covenant.
The supreme court reversed the trial court and remanded the case. It
concluded that although the trial court had applied the correct legal doctrine, its findings were not supported by substantial evidence.' The changed
circumstances doctrine prohibits courts from enjoining violations of covenants in instances when the changes in an area "are so radical as to
frustrate the original purposes and intention of the parties to such restrictions." 3 7 The court's role, therefore, is to determine whether the changes
are of such magnitude so as to defeat the purpose of the covenant.
In Whorton, the purpose of the covenant in the original deeds was to
preserve the desirability of the residential and business areas to the inhabitants.38 The court concluded that the evidence did not show that the
changes the area underwent defeated the purpose for which the restrictions
were established.39 Although the restrictions rendered the restaurants less
competitive, the court found that this was an insufficient reason to deny
the equitable relief sought.'
The majority of the court read the restriction strictly and interpreted
the "changed circumstances" doctrine narrowly. In a strong dissent, Justice Stowers stated that to decide whether the standard of enforceability
of a covenant, based on the changed circumstances, is met, the court
must look at the totality of the circumstances. 4 He noted that the record
supported the trial court's finding that the use, character and enjoyment
of the property covered by the covenant had materially changed.42 The
original purpose was to facilitate the development of Alamogordo, which
development had been completed.43 "When conditions change, as in the
present case, restrictive covenants should not be allowed as a barrier to
progress and change. "" Thus, according to Justice Stowers there was no
valid purpose for enforcement of the covenant.
36. Id. at 654-55, 687 P.2d at 89-90. The court stated the rule of law that "It]he judgment of a
trial court will not be disturbed on appeal if the findings of fact entered by the trial court are supported
by substantial evidence..." Id. at 653, 687 P.2d at 88 (citing Flinchum Constr. Co. v. Central
Glass & Mirror Co., 94 N.M. 398, 611 P.2d 221 (1980)). The supreme court continued stating,
"[h]owever, findings not supported by substantial evidence which have been properly attacked cannot
be sustained on appeal, and we must reverse any judgment dependent upon such findings." Id.
(citing Getz v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 90 N.M. 195, 561 P.2d 468,
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977)).
37. Whorton, 101 N.M. at 653, 687 P.2d at 88 (quoting Chuba v. Glasgow, 61 N.M. 302, 305,
299 P.2d 774, 776 (1956)).
38. Id. at 654, 687 P.2d at 89.
39. Id. at 89.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 655, 687 P.2d at 90 (Stowers, J., dissenting).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

Lockwood, Abrams & Brown v. Steiner & Barker" is the second restrictive covenant case considered by the court. In Lockwood, the court
interpreted an existing covenant in order to ascertain its scope46 and
decided whether adjacent homeowners could enforce the covenant.47
The property was part of a subdivision that came into existence in
1930. All the deeds from the development company contained a covenant
that restricted each lot to one private residence.48
Lockwood sought a declaratory judgment.49 He claimed the restrictive
covenant prohibited the Steiners from splitting their lot into two parcels
and conveying one of the parcels to the Barkers." The trial court rendered
judgment for Lockwood and held that adjacent owners had a right to
enforce the covenant.5
On appeal, the appellants proposed that applying the rules of construction to the covenant would result in a residential use restriction rather
than a one-dwelling per lot restriction. 5 2 The supreme court disagreed and
affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 3
The court said that the first step in construing a covenant is to ascertain
the intention of the parties by reading the language of the covenant "in
the light of the whole instrument and the circumstances under which it
was executed."'54 After looking at the language of the covenant and the
circumstances under which it was executed, the court rejected the Steiners'
suggestion that the restriction merely addressed the nature of the use.
The court concluded that because most lots have a covenant restricting
use to one residence, the trial court's construction of the covenant was
reasonable. 5 The court refused to lift the restriction from individual lots
within the subdivision because it would hinder reliance on such restrictions. The original purpose of the covenant had not changed, and it still
provided a benefit to the lots. The covenant, therefore, would be enforced. 6
45. 101 N.M. 783, 689 P.2d 932 (1984).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 784, 689 P.2d at 933. The covenant provides "[t]hat no building whatever except a
private dwelling house with the necessary outbuildings, including a private garage, shall be erected,
placed or permitted on said premises or any part thereof, and said dwelling house permitted on said
premises shall be used as a private residence only.
The covenant appeared in appellants' and
appellees' deeds.
49. Lockwood, 101 N.M. at 783, 689 P.2d at 932. Hereinafter plaintiffs-appellees will be referred
to as "Lockwood." It is noteworthy that the zoning in the area allows a single family dwelling per
half acre. The Steiners' lot, the one in question in this case, is 2.53 acres. Id. at 784, 689 P.2d at
933.
50. Id. at 783, 689 P.2d at 932.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 784, 689 P.2d at 933.
53. Id. at 783, 689 P.2d at 932.
54. Id. at 784, 689 P.2d at 933 (citing Rowe v. May, 44 N.M. 264, 101 P.2d 391 (1940)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 785, 689 P.2d at 934.
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Thus, as in Whorton, the supreme court read and construed the Lockwood covenant strictly, according to its terms. It is apparent that so long
as the benefit of a covenant still exists, according to its creation and
purpose, the courts will uphold it. Exceptions such as changed circumstances will be read narrowly.
B. Public Land Use Controls-Zoning
The last case in this section concerns zoning restrictions. In City of
Las Cruces v. Huerta & Apostolic Tabernacle de Las Cruces,57 the court
of appeals considered whether certain restrictions were inapplicable to
the operation of a religious school because it was a pre-existing" or
incidental use59 to a permitted use. It also considered whether disallowing
the operation of the school would violate the free exercise clause of the
first amendments to the United States and New Mexico Constitutions.'
The church owned a building in Las Cruces where it had conducted
religious services for several years. In 1979 when the church building
was erected, the area was zoned R-1 residential. This classification allowed construction of single family homes, churches and "incidental
church facilities. ,61
A new zoning scheme enacted by the city became effective on August
3, 1981. Although the area remained zoned residential, the new scheme
required that private, public or parochial schools could only be established
pursuant to the issuance of a special use permit by the planning and
zoning commission after holding a public hearing.62
Without applying for a special use permit, the church erected a school
building in early 1981 and began holding classes in September.63 The
city petitioned the district court for an order to enjoin operation of the
school because it was in violation of the new code. After a hearing, the
court granted plaintiff the requested relief. The trial court found that the
57. 102 N.M. 182, 692 P.2d 1331 (Ct. App. 1984).
58. Id. at 183, 692 P.2d at 1332. See HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT
CONTROL LAW 146-47 (1975): Nearly all zoning ordinances provide that a use may continue if it
lawfully preexists the adoption of a zoning ordinance, though it would be unlawful if the use was
established after the passage of the ordinance.
In City of Las Cruces, the court noted that "a non-conforming use existing at the time of the
effective date of a zoning ordinance may be continued..." 102 N.M. at 185, 692 P.2d at 1334.
59. Id.at 184, 692 P.2d at 1333. The court defined "incidental use" as "[a]n accessory, incidental
or auxiliary use is one which is dependent on or pertains to the principal or main use, and which
may be considered an integral part of the primary use." Id.at 184, 692 P.2d at 1333 (citing 8 E.
McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.125, at 377 (3d. ed. 1983) (footnotes omitted)).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. I. provides "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and petition the Government for redress of
grievances." The free exercise claim is also made under N.M. CONST. art. II, § 11.
61. City of Las Cruces, 102 N.M. at 183, 692 P.2d at 1332.
62. Id.Hereinafter the new zoning scheme will be referred to as the new scheme, new plan or
new code.
63. Id.The school use was not limited to religious instruction. Id.
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school use was a more intensive use than the church use, that the operation
of a school disturbed the peace and quiet of the neighborhood and created
a safety hazard, and that commencing to run a school after the effective
date of the new zoning scheme was illegal because a special use permit
had not been issued.'
The defendants appealed the trial court ruling on the following grounds:
(1) the operation of the school was an incidental/accessory use of the
church premises; (2) operation of the school was a pre-existing use; 65 and
(3) operation of the school was protected by the United States and New
Mexico Constitutions.' 6 The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court and addressed the defendant's three arguments.
First, the court rejected the church's argument that operation of the
school was an incidental use to the use of church premises .67 Although
the court did not dispute that the right to a religious use included a right
to conduct incidental or accessory uses, it ruled that operation of a parochial school was not an incidental use and, therefore, impermissible
without a special use permit.68
The church's second argument was that operation of the school was
permissible as a prior non-conforming use. However, the court ruled that
in order for a use to be considered pre-existing, actual use must have
commenced prior to the effective date of the zoning ordinance. A mere
intention to commence use does not suffice for a non-conforming use to
qualify.69 The court adopted a rule of use in fact. Because the school here
was not in fact in use prior to the effective date of the new code, there
was no pre-existing use. Consequently, such use by the church was illegal.7"
64. Id. at 183-84, 692 P.2d at 1332-33.
65. Id. at 184, 692 P.2d at 1333.
66. Id. at 185-86, 692 P.2d at 1334-35. See supra note 60.
67. City of Las Cruces, 102 N.M. at 185, 692 P.2d at 1334. The unchallenged non-conforming
use is the church's right to continue operating as a church and any incidental or accessory uses. See
supra note 59 for definition of incidental/accessory use.
68. City of Las Cruces, 102 N.M. at 185, 692 P.2d at 1334 (quoting Damascus Community
Church v. Clackamas County, 45 Or. App. 1065, 1071, 610 P.2d 273, 276 (1980), appeal dismissed,
450 U.S. 902 (1981)).
69. Id. at 184-85, 692 P.2d at 1333-34. In support of this rule the court quoted extensively from
8A E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.188, at 34 (3d ed. 1976):
The general rule is that actual use as distinguished from merely contemplated
use when a zoning restriction opposed to it becomes effective is essential to its
protection as a lawful nonconforming use ....
[Ilt is not the present intention
to put property to a future use but the present use of the property which must be
the criterion ....
[M]ere intentions or plans at the time a zoning ordinance
becomes effective to use particular land or dwellings for a certain use does not
entitle one to that use in contravention of the ordinance ...
A purchase of property with an intention to use it for a particular purpose does
not in itself give a right to use it for that purpose as against a subsequent zoning
ordinance or restriction.
City of Las Cruces, 102 N.M. at 184-85, 692 P.2d at 1333-34.
70. Id. at 185, 692 P.2d at 1334.
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Third, the court rejected the church's argument that the United States
and the New Mexico Constitutions protected the operation of the school.
It recognized the constitutional protection, but noted that the right is not
immune from governmental regulations. Municipalities may impose rational and reasonable zoning ordinances upon religious institutions. The
city did not prohibit school use-it merely required the church to obtain
a special use permit. The court concluded that the regulation was a
reasonable exercise of the city's police power.7'
City of Las Cruces supports the promulgation of reasonable zoning
regulations by governmental bodies and ensures the procedural steps in
their enforcement. In addition, the case articulates the standards for establishing the scope of incidental and pre-existing uses.
II. ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS
This section presents two cases decided during the last year. One case
concerned a tax sale.72 The other, a case of first impression in New
Mexico, created a private nuisance action in favor of surface rights holders
against mineral rights holders.73
A. Tax Sale
In Tabet v. Campbell,74 the Tabets purchased real property in 1963 and
in 1971 failed to pay property taxes.75 In 1973, the county treasurer issued
a tax deed to the State of New Mexico for the Tabets' property.7 6 The
deed was recorded in 1975.
On April 27, 1982, the state notified the Tabets7 7 that a tax deed had
been issued to the state and if they did not "repurchase the property within
30 days of notice, the property would be sold at public auction. 78 In
response, the Tabets made timely payment to the county treasurer. The
county treasurer's affidavit was used as evidence that she believed the
payment to be for the current tax year. Therefore, she placed it in the
pending file. The state, receiving neither payment nor notice of payment
from the county treasurer, sold the property to Campbell on June 3, 1982. 79
Two weeks after the sale, the Tabets sued to invalidate the deed to
Campbell and have the property deeded back to the Tabets. The trial
71.
72.
73.
rev'd,
74.
75.
76.
77.
1961).
78.
79.

Id.at186, 692 P.2d at 1335.
Tabet v.Campbell, 101 N.M. 334, 681 P.2d II1 (1984).
Carter Farms Co. v.Amoco Pro. Co., 23 N.M. St. B. Bull. 1173 (Ct. App. Nov. 15, 1984),
Amoco Prod. Co. v.Carter Farms Co., 103 N.M. 117, 703 P.2d 894 (1985).
101 N.M. 334, 681 P.2d 1111 (1984).
Id. at 335, 681 P.2d at 1112. The amount of unpaid taxes was $42.35.
This was done pursuant to N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-8-15 (1953 & Repl. Pamp. 1961).
The notification was pursuant to N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-8-29, 72-8-30 (1953 & Repl. Pamp.
Tabet, 101 N.M. at 335, 681 P.2d at 1112.
Id.
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court granted summary judgment for the Tabets. The supreme court affirmed the trial court and held that the Tabets had satisfied the statutory
requirements by making timely payment to the county treasurer.80
The court considered Campbell's argument"' that the applicable law is
the law at the time the tax is imposed. In 1971, the law provided that
the state tax commission,2 since abolished, was the appropriate government agency to receive tax payments. Therefore, Campbell argued that
payment to the county treasurer did not satisfy the statutory requirements.
The supreme court agreed that the Wormans3 standard applied.8 4 However, it noted that under Worman, Campbell's title would be defeated if,
inter alia, the property was redeemed from the sale. 5 Citing to precedent,86 the court held that "to redeem" was synonymous with "to repurchase," and held that the Tabets' payment to the county treasurer
constituted a repurchase. Consequently, Campbell's title failed."
The supreme court considered the relationship between the State Tax
Commission-the government agency designated to collect taxes in 1971and the county treasurer to determine that the Tabets had "repurchased"
the property in 1982. The plaintiffs submitted affidavits88 which established that the county treasurer was authorized by statute 9 to accept
payment of delinquent taxes and was an agent of the state for purposes
of tax collection.' It, therefore, found that the state was bound by the
county treasurer's acceptance of plaintiffs' payment, and declared the
defendant's deed to be void. 9
80. Two issues were raised on appeal: (1) whether timely payment to the county treasurer satisfied
statutory requirements to effect repurchase of property by a delinquent taxpayer; (2) whether the
inaction of the county treasurer upon receipt of the payment was sufficient to defeat the defendants'
title. Because of its decision on the first issue the supreme court did not address the second issue.
See infra note 82, for the statutory requirements.
81. The defendant based his argument on Worman v. Echo Ridge Homes Coop., Inc., 98 N.M.
237, 647 P.2d 870 (1982), which he argued had precedential value.
82. In 1971, the law providing for sale of realty for delinquent taxes was N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 72-8-1-72-8-52 (1953 & Repl. Pamp. 1961). Specifically, section 72-8-32 provided for payment
to be made to the state tax commission. The state tax commission was abolished in 1970; its modern
equivalent is the New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department, Property Tax Division. N.M.
STAT. ANN. §9-11-4 (1978). See Tabet, 101 N.M. at 335,681 P.2d at 1112.
83. Worman v. Echo Ridge Homes Coop., Inc., 98 N.M. 237, 647 P.2d 870 (1982).
84. Tabet, 101 N.M. at 336, 681 P.2d at 1113. It is noteworthy that, against this argument, the
plaintiffs cited Buescher v. Jaquez, 101 N.M. 2, 677 P.2d 615 (1984), where the supreme court
held that the applicable law was the law in effect at the time of the tax sale. Here, the court limits
its holding in Buescher to instances where the tax was imposed in 1975 or later.
85. Worman, 98 N.M. at 239, 647 P.2d at 872.
86. Tabet, 101 N.M. at 336, 681 P.2d at 1113 (citing Sanchez v. New Mexico State Tax Comm.,
51 N.M. 154, 180 P.2d 246 (1947)).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. N.M. STAT. ANN. §7-38-62 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
90. N.M. STAT. ANN. §7-38-42 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
91. Tabet, 101 N.M. at 337, 681 P.2d at 1114.
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B. Private Nuisance
Carter Farms Co. v. Amoco Production Co.92 presented a matter of
first impression in the New Mexico courts. Carter Farms was a private
nuisance action based on the failure of the mineral rights owner to restore
land to a condition satisfactory to the surface rights owner.93 Plaintiff,
Carter Farms, owned the surface rights to the property in question. Amoco
was a lessee of the mineral rights to the same property.'
Defendant had drilled two wells on the property. At one of the wells,
Amoco drilled four pits-two of which were lined with plastic, one was
unlined, and one into which brine water was discharged. After the drilling
stopped, Carter Farms wanted Amoco to remove the waste material from
the pits instead of merely leveling the pits. Carter Farms alleged that
spreading out the waste and building materials would make the land
unusable to the company as owner of the property.95 Carter Farms instituted this action as a private nuisance action based on the defendant's
failure (1) to remove the materials brought onto the land to build the pits,
and (2) to restore the land to a condition that was acceptable to the
plaintiff.'

The jury found for Carter Farms; but the court, on its own, granted
Amoco a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the action had
no basis in New Mexico law. On appeal, the court of appeals considered
whether a lessee has a duty to restore the surface as closely as possible
to its original condition, and, if so, whether a breach of this duty supports
a private nuisance theory.9 7 The court answered the question in the affirmative.9

The appeals court strongly argued that "this right of invasion of the
92. 23 N.M. St. B. Bull. 1173 (Ct. App. Nov. 15, 1984), Amoco Prod. Co. v. Carter Farms
Co., 103 N.M. 117, 703 P.2d 894 (1985).
93. Id.
94. Carter Farms, 23 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 1175. The appeals court, quoting Bummer, The
Rancher's Subservient Surface Estate, 5 LAND & WATER L. REv. 49 (1970), defined the surface
owner's rights and the mineral owner's rights as follows:
The lessee is considered to have the dominant estate and the surface owner the
subservient estate. The lessee of the mineral estate has a fundamentally superior
position, which entitles him to the free and uninhibited use of the surface estate
to such an extent as is reasonably necessary to explore for and develop mineral
production. Thus, by the very act of executing the oil and gas lease, the lessor
has created a severance of the mineral estate which will entitle his lessee to go
upon the land and do all things 'necessary or incidental' to his operations 'to the
exclusion of the lessor.' The only qualification made by the courts is that the
lessee must exercise his rights 'with due regard' to the rights of the owners of
the surface. That quantum of 'due regard' means only that the rancher-lessor may
use his surface in any manner not inconsistent with the lessee's rights.
95. CarterFarms, 23 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 1174-75.
96. Id. at 1174.
97. Id. The defendant cross appealed the measure of damages.
98. Id.
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surface must carry with it certain corresponding duties and obligations. "99
Although the mineral estate is the dominant estate, the holder of that
estate has an implied duty to the owner of the surface rights-the dominant
estate owner must exercise his or her rights with due regard to the rights
of the owners of the surface."0
The court of appeals concluded 1"' that the theory of recovery most
consistent with New Mexico law was a private nuisance theory. 0' 2 Under
such a theory the consideration is whether the lessee's use of the surface
was reasonable. If the surface owner established that the lessee's use was
not reasonable and constituted an interference with the surface owner's
use and enjoyment of the property, then the lessee's actions would constitute a private nuisance. "'
In the present case, the court of appeals ordered the jury verdict reinstated. It found that the jury had been instructed properly regarding the
elements of a private nuisance and that there was sufficient evidence to
support its verdict."
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the trial
court's grant of Amoco's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict."0 5 The supreme court reviewed two issues:
1. whether the Court of Appeals erred in imposing on a mineral
lessee an implied contractual duty to completely restore the surface
estate following the cessation of drilling operations, in addition to
the remedies available under existing law, and
2. whether the Court of Appeals applied the proper measure of
damages for injury to real property."°
With respect to the first issue, the court noted that Amoco "constructed
a reserve pit, as required by the regulations of the New Mexico Oil
Conservation Division, which was necessary to its operation at the drilling
site. . . . " "' The supreme court also noted that the trial court had concluded "that Amoco's proposed method of leveling the reserve pit and
cleaning the debris was reasonable."' 08 The court recognized that several
states have statutorily imposed a duty on mineral rights owners to restore
99. Id. at1175.
100. Id.
101. Id. The court of appeals considered various theories of recovery.
102. Id. at 1175-76.
103. Id. at 1176.
104. Id. The court also found concerning defendant's cross-appeal on the question of damages
that the proper measure of damages was cost of restoration and not, as the defendant argued,
diminution in value.
105. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Carter Farms Co., 103 N.M. 117, 703 P.2d 894 (Ct. App. 1985).
106. CarterFarms, 23 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 1176.
107. Id.at 1177.
108. Amoco, 103 N.M. at 118, 703 P.2d at 895.

Winter 1986]

PROPERTY LAW

the surface on public nuisance theories,' °9 but the court refused "to adopt
private nuisance as a theory of recovery for diminution in value [of
land] ." oThe supreme court added that a reason for not adopting a private
nuisance theory is that usually recovery can be based on negligence. "'
Because the trial court found that Amoco's proposed way of cleaning up
was reasonable the court did not remand the case on this question.
With respect to the second issue, the court disagreed with the court of
appeals' measure of damages. The supreme court reiterated that the measure of damages under a negligence theory for permanent damage to real
property is "the difference between the fair market value of the land prior
to the injury and the fair market value of the land after the full extent of
injury has been determined. ""2 The supreme court held that the court of
appeals was incorrect in holding "that the owner of the mineral estate
must either restore the surface area to its original condition . . . or pay

the costs of restoring even where the use of the surface area is reasonably
necessary and the operator has exercised due regard for the rights of the
surface owner. " 113

Thus, the supreme court in Carter Farms appears to have limited the
theory of recovery of surface rights owners to a negligence theory. The
basis of a claim will depend upon a showing of an "unreasonably, excessive or negligent use of the surface estate. " 4 A private nuisance action
will not stand.
III. DEEDS AND TITLES

The court during this time decided four cases on deeds and titles. Two
dealt with adverse possession," '5 one with fixtures" 6 and one concerned
a boundary dispute."'
A. Adverse Possession
In Slemmons v. Massie & Harless"' the supreme court considered
whether a mortgage constitutes color of title which can support a claim
for adverse possession. Slemmons and her late husband purchased the
109. Id.; See, e.g., KAN. STAT.ANN. §§55-132a(1983);ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 100-12§26(1983).
110. Amoco, 103 N.M. at 119, 703 P.2d at 896.
111. Id. The court noted that Carter Farms did not suggest the adoption of a theory that implied
responsibility for a contractual provision or an implied duty to restore the land.
112. Id. at 913.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Slemmons v. Massie, 102 N.M. 33, 690 P.2d 1027 (1984); Blumenthal v. Concrete Constr.
Co., 102 N.M. 125, 692 P.2d 50 (Ct. App. 1984).
116. Kerman v. Swafford, 101 N.M. 241, 680 P.2d 622 (1984).
117. Vigil v. Arguello, 23 N.M. St. B. Bull. 717 (Ct. App. 1984), aff'd, 102 N.M. 327, 695
P.2d 477 (1985).
118. 102 N.M. 33, 690 P.2d 1027 (1984).
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property in question in 1945 and gave a note and mortgage, in the amount
of $3,000, to a bank. In 1950, defendant Massie, plaintiff's sister-inlaw, paid off the note and the bank assigned the mortgage to her. Massie
never received any payment on the mortgage from Slemmons.119
Massie claimed that pursuant to her payment of the note, her brother
orally agreed that title in the property vested in her. Massie also alleged
that she paid property taxes from 1960 to 1978. 2° Slemmons made contrary claims. She suggested that she and her husband only intended to
convey to Massie a one-half interest in the property. Further, she claimed
that she and her husband paid at least half of the taxes until 1960 and
continued to pay their share until 1978 by virtue of waiving their right
to one-half the rental income. It was undisputed that Slemmons placed
the property in the USDA Soil Bank program between 1958 and 1963,
during which time the proceeds were divided equally between Slemmons
and Massie.' 2'
In 1978, Massie deeded the property to her daughter and son-in-law,
the Harlesses, also defendants in this action. Slemmons brought a quiet
title and ejectment action. Massie and the Harlesses maintained that they
acquired title to the property by adverse possession and that they satisfied
the color of title requirement with the mortgage that the bank assigned
to Massie.' 2 2
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held that
Slemmons and Massie were tenants in common, each holding an undivided one-half interest in the property. 123 The supreme court affirmed the
district court's decision and held that a mortgage does not constitute color
of title pursuant to which ownership may be obtained by adverse possession. 12
The supreme court reasoned that in order to give color of title, an
instrument must attempt to convey title to the adverse party. In New
Mexico a mortgage is merely a lien on property and passes no title to
the mortgaged property; it gives only a right to enforce the lien.' 25 Thus,
because title by adverse possession cannot be proven if one of the elements
is lacking and here the color of title requirement was missing, color of
title cannot pass by adverse possession.126
119. Id. at 34, 690 P.2d at 1028.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. The requirements for establishing title by adverse possession are set forth in N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 37-1-21 (1978).
123. Slemmons, 102 N.M. at 34, 690 P.2d at 1028.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. The court noted that the element of hostility also seemed to be lacking. However, the
court did not address the issue because the absence of color of title defeated the possibility of
establishing title by adverse possession.

Winter 1986]

PROPERTY LAW

In the second adverse possession case, Blumenthal v. Concrete Constructors Co.,' 27 the court of appeals looked at the necessary elements to
establish title by adverse possession. In addition, it examined issues of
the adequacy of descriptions in deeds and of equitable defenses.
In June of 1955 the C de Bacas, owners of the real estate in question,
executed a note and mortgage in favor of the Toulouses who had guaranteed a bank mortgage for them. In March of 1956 the C de Bacas, by
quit claim deed, conveyed the property to the Toulouses, in satisfaction
of the mortgage. This deed had a metes and bounds description. In July
1956, the Toulouses conveyed the property by quit claim deed to the
Blumenthals using the same description as in the C de Bacas' conveyance.
The Blumenthals recorded the deed in August 1956.128
Mrs. C de Baca died in 1959. When Mr. C de Baca died in 1965, his
heirs never probated his estate. Between April and August of 1973, one
of the C de Baca's daughters obtained quitclaim deeds to the property
from her siblings. In 1980, she entered into a real estate contract with
defendant Concrete to sell her interest in the property. Concrete then
recorded a subdivision plat of the property which divided the land into
three lots. Defendant Dale and intervenor Denison were involved in conveyances concerning Lot 1. Defendants Houghtons entered into a real
estate contract with Concrete for Lot 2. Concrete claimed ownership to
Lot 3.129

The Blumenthals instituted an action to quiet title to the 16.922 acres
which comprised the entire property. The court ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs on all but three acres. With respect to those three acres it ruled
in favor of intervenor Denison. Both the Blumenthals and Concrete appealed the decision. The court of appeals considered whether: (1) the
description of the property in the C de Baca to Toulouse deed was adequate
to convey any interest; (2) the instrument from C de Baca to Toulouse
was intended to be a mortgage; (3) plaintiffs were affected by laches or
estoppel regarding Denison's claim; and (4) Denison had established a
claim by adverse possession. 130 These claims are discussed separately
below.
1. Adequacy of Deed Description
The court of appeals held that the deed description sufficed to convey
the property. The established rule is that to make a valid conveyance, the
127. 102 N.M. 125, 692 P.2d 50 (1984).
128. Id. at 128, 692 P.2d at 53. It is noteworthy that during the early sixties plaintiffs had brought
two quiet title actions involving the property in question. Neither suit was pursued to completion.
The district court, however, did not consider that the dismissal without prejudice of these two actions
adversely affected the plaintiffs' title in any way.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 127-28, 692 P.2d at 52-53.
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land must be identifiable and ascertainable. 3 ' C de Baca personally had
escorted the Toulouses and the Blumenthals to the property and pointed
to all the boundaries 32and comer monuments. All parties were satisfied
with the boundaries. 1
The defendant relied on Komadina v. Edmondson'3 3 to point to the
requirement of an accurate description and for the statement of the rule
that if extrinsic evidence is used for the description, the deed itself must
point to such evidence. The court disagreed with the defendant on the
applicability of Komadina to resolve the dispute. The court noted that
34
New Mexico courts do not limit the admissibility of extrinsic evidence. 1
In addition, the difference between Komadina and the present dispute
was that in Komadina, the court found the evidence regarding the property
description insufficient, whereas in Blumenthal the court determined the
property to be identifiable. Unlike Komadina, the court did not question
the adequacy of the property description and, therefore, the conveyance
was upheld.' 35
2. Is Instrument a Deed or a Mortgage?
The court of appeals found no evidence to support the argument that
the parties intended the conveyance to be a mortgage. Because the deed
was given to extinguish a debt, the court found substantial evidence to
support the trial court's finding that the instrument was a deed. 36
3. Equitable Defenses
The trial court concluded that the Blumenthals were guilty of laches
and estoppel as to the Denison lot only. The Blumenthals contended that
the trial court erred in its conclusion. In addition, Concrete disagreed
with the trial court's holding and claimed that the Blumenthals were guilty
of laches and estoppel with respect to the whole tract. The basis for their
claim was that the defenses of laches and estoppel were proper because
of plaintiff's absence from the property between 1974 and 1981. "' The
court of appeals disagreed with Concrete's argument, emphasizing that
although the plaintiffs did not visit the property for seven years, delay
or lapse of time alone did not constitute laches or work an estoppel., 31
131.
(1967),
132.
133.
134.
the use
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 129-30, 692 P.2d at 54-55 (citing Marquez v. Padilla, 77 N.M. 620, 426 P.2d 593
quoting Armijo v. New Mexico Town Co., 3 N.M. (Gild., E.W.S. ed.) 427,5 P. 709 (1885).
Id.at 129, 692 P.2d at 54.
81 N.M. 467, 468 P.2d 632 (1970).
Blumenthal, 102 N.M. at 130, 692 P.2d at 55. The court noted that Komadina in fact permits
of extrinsic evidence.
Id. at 129-31, 692 P.2d at 54-56.
Id. at 131, 692 P.2d at 56.
Id. Also, there had been improvements on the property and conveyance had been made.
Id. at 131-32, 692 P.2d at 56-57.
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4. Adverse Possession
The Blumenthals questioned whether the evidence was sufficient to
support a finding that Denison acquired title by adverse possession. The
court listed the elements necessary to establish ownership by adverse
possession: (1) color of title and (2) actual, visible, exclusive, hostile
and continuous possession.' 9 The court of appeals concluded that although the evidence supported Denison's color of title for a period of ten
years, she could not claim continuous and exclusive possession. The
record offered no evidence to establish Denison's predecessors as being
in actual, continuous, exclusive possession before 1980. Consequently,
there was no support for Denison's claim, and the court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision that awarded Denison ownership of the
property. 4

B. Fixtures
In Kerman v. Swafford 4 ' the court of appeals reviewed whether certain
fixtures were part of the realty that was conveyed. The court elaborated
on the legal test used to determine whether certain objects are fixtures.
In 1971, defendant Swafford purchased the pre-fabricated buildings in
question while he was in possession of the ranch where the buildings
were installed.142 In 1973, a separate federal court action between Kerman
and Swafford resulted in a judgment for Kerman, and Kerman settled
when Swafford delivered to him two promissory notes and a deed of trust
on the ranch. When Swafford defaulted on the notes Kerman started
foreclosure proceedings. On September 12, 1978, a judgment entered in
favor of Kerman "'forever barred' Swafford from claiming any interest
in the property aside from his statutory right of redemption, which SwafThe judgment, however, was silent as to the
ford never exercised. "113
buildings themselves and as to whether they passed with the title to the
ranch.
Kerman subsequently purchased the ranch at the foreclosure sale but
allowed Swafford to live there, rent-free, until Kerman found a tenant or
a buyer. In 1980, upon learning that Kerman found a buyer, Swafford
filed a claim of lien on the ranch "alleging that he had an implied contract
139. Id. at132, 692 P.2d at57 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-21 (1978)).
140. Id.at132-33, 692 P.2d at57-58.
141. 101 N.M.241, 680 P.2d 622 (Ct.App. 1984), cert. denied, 101 N.M. 189, 679 P.2d 1287
(1984).
142. Id. at243, 680 P.2d at624. There were three buildings the ownership of which was in
question. All three buildings were metal and prefabricated. They were assembled atthe ranch and
with bolts screwed onto concrete slabs. The buildings have not been moved
attached tothe realty
installation.
since their
143. Id.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 16

for services rendered to protect the land and buildings from 1978-82. 114
This led Kerman to institute the instant action to recover possession and
quiet title to the ranch property.
One day after Kerman moved for a default judgment, Swafford answered the complaint and raised several counterclaims. The trial court
granted the default judgment but refused to strike the counterclaims. Then,
on Kerman's motion, the trial court granted summary judgment with
respect to the counterclaim that concerned ownership of the buildings.1 4 5
Swafford appealed. "4
The court of appeals considered whether the buildings on the land were
fixtures so that entitlement to the land was tantamount to entitlement to
the buildings. The appeals court referred to Southwestern Public Service
Co. v. Chaves County147 and noted three relevant factors to be used in
determining whether an item is a fixture that must be treated as part of
the realty: (1) intent, (2) adaptation and (3) annexation. Further, intent
is "the controlling consideration and the chief fixture test," while adaptation and annexation are mainly indicators of intent. 4'Although intent
must "affirmatively and plainly appear," 149 a court may infer or presume
a fixture from the circumstances in instances where it "finds sufficient
objectively manifested intent." 5 '
The court concluded that "the nature of the property, the manner of
its construction, and its intended use" indicated that the defendant in144. Id.
145. Id. at 242, 680 P.2d at 623. The other claims were settled by stipulated judgment.
146. The grounds for the appeal were that the plaintiff failed to meet N.M. R. Civ.P. 56 which
requires that the moving party establish there exist no genuine issues of material fact; thus, he is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The relevant section of N.M. R. Civ. P. 56 provides as
follows:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. N.M. R. Civ. P.
56(c).
The defendant also alleged that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a protective order
limiting defendant to deposing plaintiff in plaintiff's place of residence. On this issue the court of
appeals concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion.
147. 85 N.M. 313, 512 P.2d 73 (1973).
148. Kerman, 101 N.M. at 243, 680 P.2d at 624 (citing Boone v. Smith, 79 N.M. 614, 447 P.2d
23 (1968)).
149. Id. at 244, 680 P.2d at 625.
150. Id. (citing Patterson v. Chaney, 24 N.M. 156, 173 P. 859 (1918)). The court further quoted
from Patterson to establish specific matters that are to be taken into consideration:
The nature of the property, the manner of its construction, and its intended use
all go to show that it was the intention of the party who made the improvements
that they should be permanent additions to the land. There is no evidence
tending to show a contrary intent. Under such circumstances the articles, so
attached, are presumed to have become a part of the realty. ...
24 N.M. at 160, 173 P. at 860 (emphasis added).

Winter 19861

PROPERTY LAW

tended "to make permanent additions to the land."' 5 The court considered
two additional factors in support of its holding. First, because the buildings were substantial, they were presumptively part of the realty when
Swafford installed them.' 52 In addition, the buildings were part of the
realty because they were attached to the land when Swafford gave Kerman
an interest in the land by way of a mortgage.' 53 The court noted that
"objects which are attached to the realty at the time a mortgage is granted
and which are, from all outward manifestations, intended for permanent
use and enjoyment in connection with the realty pass under the mortgage."" It is important to note that the court, in determining whether
an item is a fixture, used an objective test--circumstances-not a sub55
jective test of the state of mind of the annexor at the time of attachment. '
BeThe procedural aspects of the court's affirmance are noteworthy.
cause Kerman made a primafacie showing of entitlement, Swafford bore
the burden of setting forth specific facts to demonstrate a genuine issue
' The court emphasized that when circumstances show
of material fact. 56
a clear intent to affix an article to the realty, the party who asserts the
article is a fixture does not have to address every subfactor, i.e., annexation and adaptation.' The portable nature of the buildings was not
conclusive of lack of intent or annexation. There is no requirement of
permanent annexation, and capability of the structures to be disassembled
is not tantamount to lack of annexation.' 8 Finally, an intent to install
portable structures does not create an issue of material fact with respect
to an intent to install fixtures. The parties agreed that the buildings were
portable. Only the legal effect of the annexation was at issue. The intent
to affix fixtures was clear from the facts and circumstances.' 9 Thus,
Swafford failed to show a genuine issue of material fact that would
preclude a grant of summary judgment.
C. Boundary Disputes
Vigil v. Arguello"6 was a quiet title suit in which the parties sought to
establish the boundaries between their property. The court, in reaching
151. Kerman, 101 N.M. at 244, 680 P.2d at 625.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.(citing Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Jensen, 69 S.D. 225, 9 N.W.2d 140 (1943)).
The court was not persuaded by the defendant's focus on the portability of the buildings. It found
that the buildings need not be "permanently" attached to the land to be a fixture.
155. Id. at 245, 680 P.2d at 626.
156. See supra note 140.
157. Kerman, 101 N.M. at 245, 680 P.2d at 626.
158. Id.
159. Id. See also supra notes 141-49 and accompanying text.
160. 23 N.M. St. B. Bull. 717 (Ct. App. May 15, 1984), aff'd, 102 N.M. 327, 695 P.2d 477
(1985).
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its decision, discussed respective burdens of proof and the best evidence
to resolve the controversy.
Plaintiffs, the Vigils, and defendant, Arguello, each traced their titles
to deeds, containing metes and bounds descriptions, given in 1917 by
the Trustees of the Community of Los Hueros. 6 ' The basis of the boundary
line proposed by the Vigils was a resurvey of the property that the trial
court found conformed with a 1912 map produced pursuant to a survey
by a Mr. Fraker. However, the resurvey included calls that differed from
62
those shown on the Fraker map and which appeared on their deed. 1
The defendant, on the other hand, relied on a 1978 survey which was
inconsistent with his deed and the Fraker map. The 1978 survey had calls
to establish the common boundary that differed from the calls in the
Fraker map used to establish a common boundary.' 63
In their quiet title action, the plaintiffs sued not only to establish the
boundary but also to have the court enjoin defendant from maintaining
a fence which they claimed encroached on their property. The district
court entered judgment for the plaintiff quieting title to all six tracts. It
concluded that the parties had acquiesced to the fence line as their common
boundary. "
The defendant appealed the decision that set the location of the boundary based on plaintiffs' resurvey. The court of appeals agreed with defendant that the trial court erred when it used a resurvey to determine the
common boundary.' 65 The court explained that neither the plaintiffs' nor
the defendant's surveyor followed proper methods in conducting a resurvey. The resurvey should have been based on accurately established
points in the original survey.166 Instead, the resurvey on which the trial
court relied established a boundary that differed from that in the deeds
and the Fraker map. Thus, the surveyor did not rely on the best available
evidence in establishing a comer and did not follow the Fraker calls and
distances. Therefore, the boundary established by the resurvey was not
supported by substantial evidence. Once there existed an agreed-upon
comer, the accepted comer was the best available evidence of a comer
161. Id. at 718. Deeds given subsequent to 1917 also contain metes and bounds descriptions. In
1912, one Fraker had surveyed the area and produced a map. Neither the deeds nor the Fraker map
made any reference to any monuments along the parties' boundaries.
162. Id.
163. Id. It is thus noteworthy that both plaintiffs and defendant relied on surveys that were
inconsistent with their deeds.
164. Id. at 720.
165. The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals' ruling. Vigil, 102 N.M. 327, 695 P.2d 477
(1985). It clarified the court of appeals' holding by stating that the ruling was "to direct that the
judgment to be entered by the district court be a judgment quieting title in plaintiff to all lands other
than the disputed boundary area and dismissing that portion of plaintiffs' claim."
166. The court noted that a subsequent surveyor must try to ascertain where the original surveyor
placed the boundaries rather than try to determine where new and modem surveys would place them.
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established by the Fraker survey.167 Subsequent surveyors should have
determined the boundaries by using the accepted comer and then followed
the Fraker calls and distances.168
IV. CONTRACTS
This portion of the article covers three cases. One case is on real estate
7°
contracts 16 9 and two are on real estate brokers' liabilities.
A. Real Estate Contracts
Manzano Industries Inc. v. Mathis 7' is a noteworthy case decided on
real estate contracts in which the supreme court held that forfeiture clauses
are not unconscionable per se even in instances where there has been a
substantial down payment. Manzano Industriessettles the question of the
viability of real estate contracts as a means of financing real property in
New Mexico.' 72
Purchaser Manzano Industries entered into a real estate contract with
seller Mathis for the purchase of land in Las Cruces. On several occasions
Manzano failed to make payments when due. However, there was a
contractually established 60-day period to cure. In those instances when
it had failed to make timely payment, Manzano managed to make payment
before the expiration of the 60-day period. This litigation revolved around
Manzano's failure to cure a delinquent July 1982 payment within sixty
days once Mathis made written demand."'
After Manzano's failure to cure, Mathis declared a forfeiture and terminated Manzano's interest in the property. Manzano sued to set aside
the forfeiture. The trial court denied the requested relief, and Manzano
appealed the decision alleging that the forfeiture clause was unconscion'
able. 74
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision and concluded
that the forfeiture clause was not unconscionable. It noted it "repeatedly"7 5
1
has held real estate contracts with forfeiture clauses to be enforceable.
167. Vigil, 23 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 720; See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
168. The court noted that the burden of proof on one who brings an action to quiet title is to
establish the strength of his or her own title rather than to establish the weakness of the defendant's
title. Vigil, 23 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 718.
169. Manzano Indus., Inc., v. Mathis, 101 N.M. 104, 678 P.2d 1179 (1984).
170. Swallows v. Laney, 102 N.M. 81, 691 P.2d 874 (1984); Gouveia v. Citicorp Person-toPerson Financial Center, Inc., 101 N.M. 572, 686 P.2d 262 (Ct. App. 1984).
171. 101 N.M. 104, 678 P.2d 1179 (1984).
172. See Huckins v. Ritter, 99 N.M. 560, 661 P.2d 52 (1983). The argument was that if forfeiture
clauses will not be enforced by the courts then one has to question whether real estate contracts
would continue to exist as an alternative means to finance realty.
173. Manzanolndus., 101 N.M. at 104, 678 P.2d at 1179.
174. Id.
175. Id. (citing First National Bank v. Cape, 100 N.M. 525, 673 P.2d 502 (1983); Albuquerque
National Bank v. Albuquerque Ranch Estates, Inc., 99 N.M. 95, 654 P.2d 548 (1982)).

80
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The court also reiterated that there are strong public policy considerations
76
that favor enforcement of real estate contracts. 1
The supreme court recognized that real estate contracts will not be
enforced in equity when such enforcement "shocks the conscience of the
7 7
court.
11
However, a substantial down payment is only one of the factors
to be considered. Considering other factors of the case, the court concluded that equitable relief was not warranted. 7 ' With respect to procedural considerations, the court reiterated that the determination of whether
a provision shocks the conscience of the court is within the discretion of
the trial court. Here, substantial evidence existed to support the trial
court's decision to enforce the forfeiture provision. 179
ManzanoIndustriesestablished that real estate contracts remain a viable
source of financing in New Mexico. The equitable standard-that which
"shocks the conscience of the court"-is not a catch-all that
will invalidate
all real estate contracts. It merely provides equitable protection in instances of forfeiture clauses that are repugnant to notions of fairness.
B. Real Estate Brokers' Liabilities
Swallows v. Laney 8 ' decided a question of first impression in New
Mexico. The supreme court held that the fiduciary relationship between
a real estate broker and his or her client may continue after the expiration
of the written listing agreement, depending on the transactions and relationships existing between the parties."'
The Laneys entered into two exclusive right-to-sell agreements with a
real estate brokerage company for the sale of three tracts of land. One
176. Manzano Indus., 101 N.M. at 104, 678 P.2d at 1179. (citing Bishop v. Beecher, 67 N.M.
339, 355 P.2d 227 (1960)).
177. Id. at 105, 678 P.2d at 1180 (citing Huckins v. Ritter, 99 N.M. 560, 661 P.2d 52 (1983);
Eiferle
v.Toppino, 90 N.M. 469, 565 P.2d 340 (1977)). See also Hernandez, Property Law, 15
N.M.L. REV. 345 (1985); Note, Vendor and Purchaser-Increased
Risks of Forfeitureand Malpractice
Resulting From the Use of Real Estate Contracts:Albuquerque NationalBank v. Albuquerque Ranch
Estates, Inc., 15 N.M.L. REV. 99 (1985); Note, The Future of the Real Estate Contract in New
Mexico: Huckins v. Ritter, 14 N.M.L. REv. 531 (1984); Note, The Real Estate Contract in New
Mexico: Eiferle v. Toppino, 8 N.M.L. Rev. 247 (1977-78).
178. Manzano Industries, 101 N.M. at 105, 678 P.2d at 1180. In this case the purchaser had
breached other conditions of the contract. The court stated as follows:
Substantial evidence existed in this case to support the trial court's decision to
enforce the forfeiture provision of the real estate contract. The trial court found
that appellant had basically four obligations under the contract: to make timely
monthly payments; to keep the premises in good repair; to keep the premises
insured; and to pay the taxes on the property. Appellant failed to meet its
obligations in all four areas.
179. Id. The "other" factors are set forth in text accompanying note 161 supra. The court also
noted that forfeiture was obtained only after written demand and the expiration of a 60-day period
to cure.
180. 102 N.M. 81, 691 P.2d 874 (1984).
181. Id. at 84, 691 P.2d at 877.
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of the parcels was the subject of the litigation."8 2 Swallows was the real
estate salesperson who arranged the listing. He was unable to sell any of
1980.183
the tracts prior to the expiration of the agreement on October 15,
In February of 1981, Swallows and the Laneys began negotiations for
Swallows to purchase the tract of land in question. On April 1, 1981,
Swallows prepared, signed and mailed a purchase agreement to the Laneys
who executed the agreement. A closing date was set for April 30, 1981
and subsequently orally postponed until May 26, 1981.84
The Laneys, who were living in Missouri, arrived in New Mexico on
May 23, 1981. They were, however, unable to meet with Swallows until
the evening of May 26th at which time they found out that he was not
ready to close. The Laneys, unwilling to postpone the sale further, refunded Swallows his earnest money deposit and returned to Missouri.
They rejected all subsequent attempts by Swallows to perform under the
contract. Swallows sued for breach of contract. 85
The trial court ruled for the Laneys, concluding that Swallows had
breached his fiduciary duty and that "the purchase agreement was null
and void as a matter of public policy. "'86 In addition the court found that
Swallows had failed to close in a timely manner, causing the agreement
to expire by its own terms. Thus, Swallows could not seek performance
of an expired contract.' 7
88
Swallows appealed and claimed that no fiduciary duty existed' and
that the court had erred in finding he was not prepared to close the
transaction on May 26, 1981 .189 The supreme court affirmed the decision
of the trial court.
The supreme court held that, under certain circumstances, a fiduciary
relationship between a real estate broker and his or her principal may
continue to exist after the expiration of a listing agreement. The court
concluded that the facts indicated that a fiduciary relationship continued
to exist between the parties."9 Swallows continued to act as the Laneys'
182. Id. at 82, 691 P.2d at 875.
183. Id.
184. Id.at 83, 691 P.2d at 876.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 86, 691 P.2d at 879.
190. Id. at 83-87, 691 P.2d at 876-80. The court noted the established rule that a fiduciary
relationship exists during the term of the listing agreement. During such time a broker must adhere
to the duties and obligations set forth in the trade's Code of Ethics to disclose all facts within his
or her knowledge which may affect his or her principal, especially when the broker or salesperson
buys the listed property for himself or herself. It takes this a step further here by holding that merely
because the listing agreement has expired the broker or salesperson is not absolved from his or her
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real estate agent, Swallows continued to give them advice on real estate
matters, and the Laneys continued to rely upon his aid. 9'
In order to ascertain if the agent had breached his or her fiduciary duty,
the court considered the fairness of the price paid for the property by
Swallows and the actual disclosures he made to the Laneys. Although
Swallows disclosed that he was buying the property for himself, he failed
to disclose all the facts regarding the value of the water rights and the
value of the property if sold in parcels rather than as a whole. Those facts
might have been material to the Laneys' decision to sell to him. Thus, a
breach of the fiduciary duties existed. For policy reasons the transaction
was declared void, and Swallows could not specifically enforce the contract.' 92 Thus, in Swallows, the court extended the potential fiduciary
liability of a real estate broker or salesperson beyond the period of the
listing agreement.
In Gouveia v. CiticorpPerson-to-PersonFinancialCenter, Inc.,"' the
court of appeals concluded that a real estate statement in a listing describing property to be in "All Top Shape" may lead to liability.
A broker showed the Gouveias a townhouse, and a few days later they
signed an agreement with defendant Citicorp to purchase the townhouse.
The defendant gave the Gouveias an inspection report when they signed
the agreement. Gouveias saw the townhouse, but before purchasing it,
asked the broker for a copy of the listing. That listing described the
property'9 4 as being in "All Top Shape."' 9 5
Because of various defects in the townhouse, portions of it were unusable. The Gouveias moved out and sued the various defendants for
rescission of the purchase contract or, in the alternative, for damages
obligations and duties. The court then provides the following (nonexhaustive) list of factors that are
relevant to ascertain whether a fiduciary relationship exists:
1. The course of conduct between the real estate broker or salesperson and
the principal.
2. The extent to which the broker or salesperson holds himself out to the
principal as a real estate advisor and confidant.
3. The degree of the principal's dependence on the broker or salesperson
for advice.
4. The sophistication of the principal in real estate matters.
5. The familiarity of the principal with the value of the subject property.
Id. at 84, 691 P.2d at 877.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 85-86, 691 P.2d at 878-79. In addition the supreme court held that plaintiff's unpreparedness to close on the date agreed prevents his enforcement of the contract. It found that the trial
court's finding with respect to the expiration date was supported by substantial evidence and would
stand notwithstanding the plaintiff's contention.
193. 101 N.M. 572, 686 P.2d 262 (Ct. App. 1984).
194. Id. at 575, 686 P.2d at 265. The listing and description had been prepared by defendant
Weagley on behalf of defendant Citicorp.
195. Id.
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suffered because of alleged misrepresentations. The trial court granted
defendant Weagley's motion for summary judgment. 1' Weagley had contended that "because there was no direct contact with the Gouveias until
after they purchased the house, Weagley was not a fiduciary or agent and
that New Mexico law imposed no duty on him to discover or disclose
the defects.

"'

The court of appeals disagreed with the trial court and concluded that
the broker had a legal obligation to the purchasers regarding known or
discoverable defects.' 98 The court noted that "a listing broker preparing
a property description for a multiple listing service knows, or should
know, that that description will be relied upon, both by other brokers and
by prospective buyers.""9 Therefore, "listing brokers assume a duty to
all those who subsequently rely on their characterizations of property by
virtue of making those representations."2

Consequently, if a broker,

using reasonable care should have or could have acquired knowledge of
defects in property, he or she may be held liable for negligent failure to
discover and/or to disclose those defects. 2"'
The duties the court imposed were based "on the broker's status as
fiduciary." 2' 2 Thus, there is no requirement for direct contact between
broker and purchaser in order for the duties to arise."' "The source of
liability lies in tort for negligent misrepresentation.""
196. Id. at 574, 686 P.2d at 264. Weagley refers both to the listing broker agency and the individual
broker acting on behalf of the agency.
197. Id. at 575, 686 P.2d at 265.
198. Id. at 575-76, 686 P.2d at 265-66.
199. Id. (citing generally Oates v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Service, Inc., 113
N.J. Super. 317, 273 A.2d 795 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1971)).
200. Id. at 576, 686 P.2d at 266 (citing First Church of the Open Bible v. Cline J. Dunton Realty,
Inc., 19 Wash. App. 275, 574 P.2d 1211 (1978)).
201. Id. (citing Amato v. Rathbun Realty, Inc., 98 N.M. 231, 647 P.2d 433 (Ct. App. 1982)).
202. Id.
203. Id. (citing Stotlar v. Hester, 92 N.M. 26, 582 P.2d 403 (Ct. App. 1978)).
204. Id. The court refers to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment h (1977) for
the following description of the tort of negligent misrepresentation:
[I]t is not required that the person who is to become the plaintiff be identified
or known to the defendant as an individual when the information is supplied.
It is enough that the maker of the representation intends it to reach and influence
either a particular person or persons, known to him, or a group or class of
persons, distinct from the much larger class who might reasonably be expected
sooner or later to have access to the information and foreseeably to take some
action in reliance upon it. It is enough, likewise, that the maker of the representation knows that his recipient intends to transmit the information to a
similar person, persons or group. It is sufficient, in other words, insofar as the
plaintiff's identity is concerned, that the maker supplies the information for
repetition to a certain group or class of persons and that the plaintiff proves to
be one of them, even though the maker never had heard of him by name when
the information was given.
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Defendant Weagley failed to make a primafacie case showing his lack
of actual knowledge of the defects.205 Consequently, he was not entitled
to summary judgment. The court found that there existed "at best" an
issue of material fact as to the plaintiffs' reliance on the "All Top Shape"
representation. 2°6 It, therefore, concluded that "because Weagley had a
duty to prospective buyers, and because genuine issues of material fact
exist[ed] as to whether Weagley breached its duty,' ' 2°7 it would reverse
the district court's order granting summary judgment and remand it for
further proceedings. This case, like Swallows, strictly reads and interprets
fiduciary duties owed by brokers to laypersons with whom they deal in
real estatetransactions.

205. Gouveia, 101 N.M. at 577-78, 686 P.2d at 267-68. Procedurally, Weagley, being the party
who asked for summary judgment, bore the burden of showing there were no genuine issues of
material fact. See Amato v. Rathbun Realty, Inc., 98 N.M. 231, 647 P.2d 433 (Ct. App. 1982);
Stotlar v. Hester, 92 N.M. 26, 582 P.2d 403 (Ct. App. 1978).
206. Gouveia, 101 N.M. at 578, 686 P.2d at 268.
207. Id.

